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There has been an insurrection in a part of state Y. 
'l'he insurrectionists, known as the Y otists, have re-
ceived unofficial aid and some sympathy from state X, 
and after a few 'veeks have been recognized by state 
X as state Y ota. States A and B also recognize Y ota, 
but state Y has not recognized Y ota. 
(a) Y ota subsequently declares war against state C. 
{1) How should naval and aircraft of Y ota and of 
C be treated in state B and in state D 1 
{2) What effect would the recognition of Yota as a 
state by Y have upon the treatment of naval and air-
craft of Y ota and of C 1 • 
(b) Before Y ota is recognized by state Y, a cruiser 
of Yota captures a merchant vessel of D and is taking 
it to a prize court when a cruiser of state D, which is 
near, learns the facts. What action rna y the cruiser 
of stateD legally take~ 
(c) Before Yota is recognized by state Y, state E 
declares its ports open under the 24-hour rule, while 
Yota declares all its ports closed to vessels of 'var. 
\'Vhat are the rights of vessels of war of E in the ports~ 
SOLUTION 
(a) 1. The naval air aircraft of Yota and of C are 
to be treated by states B and D as naval and aircraft 
of belligerents, though Y ota would not be regarded as 
a state by state D. 
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2. The recognition of Yota as a state by Y entitles 
the naYal and air craft of Yota to the sa1ne treatlnent 
as the naYnl and air craft of state C in all neutral ports. 
(b) The cruiser of state D n1ay, outside the jurisdic-
tion of a foreign state, dentand the release, and, if re-
fused, use necessary force to secure the release of the 
merchant Yessel of D. 
(c) State E, not haYing recognized the ) ... otists as a 
state, are not bound to respect the declaration of closure, 
though state. E n1ust take into consideration the risk 
involYed in d1sregarding the declaration. 
XOTES 
Gr>neral.-That there is a right of revolution has in 
practice been accepted for 1nany years. rfhe older 
European states "·ere particularly opposed to this doc-
trine in the early nineteenth century, "·hen they had 
:-\.n1erican colonies, and established states usually looked 
upon revolutions "·ith disfavor. Gradually it came to 
be achnitted that there ''"as a lin1it beyond w·hich an 
established state should not be responsible for action of 
persons in arn1ed organized revolt against its political 
n.uthority, and these insurrectionists "~ere not to be re-
garded as pirates, eYen though par~nt states did son1e-
ti1nes declare then1 to be pirates. nfany 1110dern states 
"·ere obliged to look to successful reYolutions as the 
ground upon "·hich their existence rested. There are 
various reasons for accepting such an assertion. If the 
successful reYolutionists "·ere not achnitted to haYe son1e 
status, many obligations "·hich the reYolutionists might 
have asstuned "·ould be en1pty. The established state 
could not 1Je liable beyond the exercise of the force at 
its disposal. 
Just "·hen a foreign state ,yould decide that those 
admitted to be jnsurgents "·ere beyond the control of 
ST~-\.TE OR GOYERN~IENT 3 
the established state and should receive recognition as 
belligerents \Vas a political question for the foreign 
state, unless the parent state should earlier recognize 
belligerency by a resort to war or other,vise. Foreign 
states are not under obligation to suffer undue incon-
venience in order that a \veak established state may 
have an unlimited time to put down an uprising \vithin 
its borders. Many questions arise as to the nature of 
rights and obligations of established states and insur-
gents. 
State or government and £nternat£onal law.-The 
state or the government of a state may have many func-
tions and attributes relating to internal and relating to 
external affairs. The internal affairs may rest upon 
constitutional la,v, \vhile the external may be deter-
mined by international law. 
A political entity, \vhich by constitutional la \V of a 
st~te might have no existence, might become for inter-
national la\v a matter of capital importance. The do-
rnestic and internatjonal legitimacy of the existence of 
a political entity may rest upon conditions of alto-
gether different nature. The legitimacy of the existence 
of a political entity for international la\v n1ay depend 
upon the action of one or more foreign states, and this 
action may be in contravention of the \viii of an estab-
lished state from \vhich the political entity may be 
f,eparating. This is evident in many states of revolu-
tionary origin. 
Recognition of belligerency.-The admission of insur-
gency by the competent authorities of a foreign state 
may bring into operation certain domestic laws and cer-
tain treaty obligations of that foreign state though no 
international status is accorded to the insurgents. The 
recognition of belligerency does, however, give an imme-
diate parity in international military status to both 
parties to the conflict. This is a general parity of mili-
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tary rights as regards all states when recognition is by 
the parent state, or as regards the recognizing state or 
states when the parent state has not recognized the insur-
gents as belligerents. 
Recognition of belligerency is thus a formal act estab .. 
lishing a status 'v hich changes the relations of all parties 
involved. When this change shall be made is usually a 
n1atter of policy and therefore a matter primarily con-
cerning the political departments of the governments. 
It is true that in the case of the Three Friends the 
Court uses the ''ord "recognition" both for political re-
volt and for war. The court, however, does distinguish 
between political revolt and war and implies that the 
first may be a fact and the second a status, saying: 
"The distinction between recognition of belligerency and recog-
nition of a condition of political revolt, between recognition of 
the existence of war in a rna terial sense and of war in a legal 
sense, is sharply illustrated by the case before us. For here the 
political department has not recognized the existence of a de 
facto belligerent power engaged in hostility with Spain, but has 
recognized the existence of insurrectionary warfare prevailing 
before, at the time and since this forfeiture is alleged to ba-re 
been incurred." (166 U. S. 1.) 
The President had in 1895 and in earlier messages 
stated the fact that "Cuba is again gravely disturbed" 
and that the people of the United States should take 1his 
fact into consideration in their actions. The Court main-
tains that domestic laws in regard to neutrality may be-
come operative 'vithout any status of belligerency, while 
the recognition of belligerency would bring into effect 
blockade, visit and search, contraband, and other inter-
ference by the belligerent parties without claim for 
reparation or damages. By the recognition of belliger-
ency, the status of all parties as far as the recognizing 
states are involved is changed and their relations are to a 
considerable degree a matter of concern for international 
]a,Y. 
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Admlssion of insurgency.-The "\Yords "admission" and 
"recognition" have often been used "~ithout distinction 
as applying to insurgency. On examination there seems 
to be a distinction 'vhich has been 1nade in actual prac-
tice. . 
The fact of an insurrection is usually evident, and as 
such must be admitted by the parent state and by for-
eign states. To this fact forejgn states may have to 
accommodate themselves 'vithout i1nplying anything as 
to the final issue or present nature of the fact. As 'vas 
pointed out in the case of the "Salvador" in 1870 by the 
,Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, a main point 
jn a case involving insurrection is the factual one of the 
existence of an insurrection. The Judicial Committee 
found "there 'vas an insurrection in the island of Cuba; 
there were insurgents who had forined themselves into a 
body of people acting together, undertaking and con-
ducting hostilities" (L. R. P. A. C. 1869-71, III, p. 218). 
It is not even essential that there be any for1nal gov-
ernmental proclan1ation by any state o£ the existence of 
an insurrection. The domestic peace o£ a state is often 
disturbed without involving other states beyond pre-
suming that they will govern their conduct accordingly . 
.. A. foreign government may bring to the attention of its 
citizens or o£ some of its departinents the £act of an 
insurrection. Such a notice may even be regarded by the 
courts as official for domestic purposes. This was men-
tioned by the Supreme Court in the case of the Three;, 
Friends, in 1897, after President Cleveland had referred 
in his message of December 2, 1895, to an insurrection as 
existing in Cuba: 
"We are thus judicially informed of the existence of an actual 
conflict of arms in resistance of the authority of a government 
with which the United States are on terms of peace and amity, 
although acknowledgment of the insurgents as belligerents by the 
political department has not taken place." (166 U. S. 1.) 
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In this case it \Yas stated that a certain section of don1es-
tic la ''" \Yould be in effect and its operation would not 
"depend upon the recognition of belligerency." 
After such an ad1nission by a foreign state, that state 
1night be under obligation to accom1nodate its conduct to 
the facts, bnt it would not thereby grant to the parent 
state and to the insurgents parity of military rights. A 
foreign state 1nay, 'vithout implying any judgn1ent upon 
the issues or extent of the conflict, adn1it that there is a 
conflict and instruct those under its jurisdiction accord-
ingly. rrhe fact of an insurrection may bring into opera-
tion do1nestic la\YS and these domestic laws of one state 
do not necessarily confonn to the la ,~,...s of other states. 
By treaty, hO\\eYer, a 1neasure of uniformity may be 
envisaged. Since 1928 a Convention relating to the 
Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife, 
(HabPna, Feu. 20, 1928, 46 Stat. Pt. 2, 2749), to which 
the United States is a party, has distinctly obligated the 
parties to the treaty to follo'' a line of conduct iinply-
ing the acln1ission of a different status fron1 that bind-
ing in ti1ne of peace or \Yhen belligerency is recognized. 
This Conyention is, at present, regional in its operation. 
Insurgency.-'fhat there is a status of insurgency 
"·hich does not involYe the consequences of belligerency 
is 110\Y \Yell established. rfhe ad1nission that SUCh a status· 
exists has been somewhat reluctantly made by European 
states. 1'here \vas a fear in the early nineteenth century 
that such admission might be an encourage1nent to revo-
lution. On the American continents most of the states 
\Yere reYolutionary in origin and son1e ad1nission of the 
facts of the struggle and accommodation of action to the 
facts often beca1ne necessary prior to the recoonition of • b 
belligPrency. A foreign state n1ight be deterred by polit-
ical or other reasons fro1n granting to insurgents the 
~atne \Yar rights as those to 'vhich the parent state \vas 
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entitled yet the fact o:f armed conflict could not be denied. 
The parties engaged in the hostilities could not claim 
rights o:f belligerents until the parent state had recog-
nized that a state of war existed, except as regards an 
individual state 'vhich had declared its neutrality. The 
parent state might regard a declaration o:f neutrality in 
ad-ranee o:f an act on its part equivalent to a declaration 
o:f war as an un:f1\iendly act by the state n1aking the neu-
trality declaration, since so :far as the conduct o:f hostili-
ties is concerned the declaration places the parent state 
and the insurgents upon the same :footing as belligerents. 
United States v. Palmer, 1818.-In a case involving 
questions in regard to piracy in connection 'vith the civil 
'var in Spanish -An1erican areas, it .. was said by the 
Supreme Court in 1818 : 
"This court is further of opinion, that when a civil war rages in 
a foreign nation, one part of which separates itself from the old 
established government, and erects itself into a distinct govern· 
ment, the courts of the union must view such newly constituted 
government as it is viewed by the legislative and executive depart· 
n1ents of the government of the United States. If the goYernment 
of the union remains neutral, but recognizes the existence of a 
civil war, the courts of the union cannot consider as criminal those 
acts of hostility, which war authorizes, and which the new gov-
ernment may direct against its enemy. In general, the same tes·· 
timony which would be sufficient to prove that a vessel or a person 
is in the service of an acknowledged state, n1ust be admitted to 
prove that a vessel or person is in the service of such newly erected 
government." (United States v. Palmer, 3 vVheaton, Supreme 
Court Reports, 610, 643.) 
Consul of Spain v. The Conception, 1819.-While the 
decision in this case was reversed in the case of The Con-
ception ( 6 Wheaton [1821 J, 235), it 'vas reYersed on ne'v 
evidence without which the decision 'vould have been 
sustained. In the Circuit Court of South Carolina in 
1819 it was said: 
The indisputable fact known, to all the world, and recognized hy 
our ,own executive in many official communications, of the exist-
ence of open, solemn war between Spain and an extensive and 
powerful colony, is enough to impose on us, as a nation, the duties 
of neutrality. The colony asserts, the social compact is violated 
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by the parent state, and the state of dependence or allegiance no 
longer existing. On this question an appeal is made to the god of 
armies, and no inferior tribunal ought to interrere. The colony 
claims from us no acknowledgment of her independence; she only 
demands of us to leave her in possession of what she can win by 
arms. Spain, unable to rescue by force, solicits our aid to seize, 
~ in violation of the rights of hospitality, the property that has 
been forced into our harb.ors; our duty is to lend our aid to 
neither, but to leave them as we find them, rigidly adhering to the 
duties of neutrality. This is not a piratical capture, and there-
fore not a case within the provisions of our treaty with Spain. It 
is a seizure in the exercise of the rights of war, not by one who 
wages war against the human race, but one who has singled out 
Spain for the sole antagonist. .All seizures of property within our 
limits we are bound by that treaty to prevent, but the duty to 
restore is confined solely to the case of rescue from those whom 
we can recognize as pirates. In the case of Palmer and others, in 
the supreme court, the principles laid down by the chief justice 
excluded all idea that this was a piratical capture. It was then 
a seizure jure belli, and the rights of war are necessarily cmn-
mensurate with the power of maintaining it openly and solen1nly, 
more especially upon the high seas, the jurisdiction of which is 
not susceptible of that demarkation and appropriation which takes 
place on the land. This conflict has long been carried on between 
the colony and parent state. The event is at least doubtful. It is 
on both sides an assertion of a supposed existing right, and neither 
can claim, of a nation to whom their disputes are immaterial, any 
act of interference which may involve it in a contest with the 
victor. (Consul of Spain v. The Conception. [1819.] Fed. Case, 
No. 3137.) 
Effect of declaration of blockade against insurgents.-
As was held in the Civil War in the United States so it 
has been held since: the declaration of a blockade against 
insurgents by an established state gives to the insurgents 
the status of belligerents. This question has been raised 
repeatedly, as by Spain, to which Great Britain gave 
reply in 187 4 : 
"Earl Granville to l\lr. Layard. 
"FoREIGN OFFICE, Febr-uary 13, 187 .q. 
"SIR: By your telegrams of the 2d instant you informed me of 
the publication, in the Madrid Gazette, of a decree declaring a 
blockade of the northern coast of Spain from Cape Penas to 
Fuentarrabia, with the exception of the ports of Gijon, Santan-
der, and San Sebastian, such blockade to commence on the 20th 
instant. 
"Her ~Iajesty's government have taken this announcement into 
their serious consideration, and have consulted the law-officers 
of the Crown thereon. 
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"They are advised that, assuming the blockade to be effective, 
they must recognize the fact that it exists de facto and de jure. 
The result, however, will be that the Carlists henceforth become 
belligerents. 
"Her Majesty's government presume that the parts of the coast 
to which the blockade is applied are in the bands of the Carlists, 
for the l\1adrid government cannot establish a municipal blockade 
of its own ports or coast, so as to entitle them to exercise $n the 
high seas belligerent rights against foreign vessels. 
"I have, therefore, to instruct you to warn the Spanish gov-
ernment that the establishment of the proposed blockade must 
lead to the issue by Her 1\.fajesty's government of a proclamation 
. of neutrality. 
"Your dispatches, No. 106, of the 2d, and No. 125, of the 6th 
instant, relative to the regulations under which the blockade, if 
established, is to be carried out, have been received. These regu-
lations will be carefully considered by Her 1\:lajesty's govern-
ment, and a further instruction will be sent to you with regard 
to them. 
"The substance of this instruction bas been sent to you by 
telegraph this day. 
"I am, &c., 
GRAN VILLE." 
(Foreign Relations, U. S., 1874, p. 551.) 
Simultaneous recognition of de facto government.-
Insurrections or revolutions may for a time be success-
ful and an established government may be overthro"Tn. 
Whether the overthro'\\"r be permanent may be a matter 
of uncertainty, though in such cases the fact that the 
control of governmental affairs has passed from the 
former hands must be admitted in order that necessary 
relations may be maintained. This admission some-
tinles takes the form of the recognition of the party in 
control as the government de facto without any neces-
sary implication that further action will follow. When, 
however, several states simultaneously grant recognition 
de facto, it may be fairly presumed that this is prelimi-
nary to complete recognition. 
A military coup d'etat was reported in Bolivia on 
July 12, 1920, and the junta taking over the government 
gave assurances that peace wo~d be maintained, that the 
rights of foreigners would be respected and that treaty 
obligations would be observed. 
1820-37--2 
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.A. dispat~h of July 17, 1920, :from the Secretary of 
State to the A1nerican l\1inister in Bolivia stated: 
''The Department desires you to keep it fully and closely in-
formed of all developments in the situation, particularly those 
affecting the foreign policy of the Government now in control. 
You are instructed to take no action which could be construed 
as constituting recognition of the Pro,·isional Government by the 
Goyenuuent of the United States." (Foreign Relations, U. S., 
1020., ,·ol. I, p. 373.) 
On July 20, 1920, a telegram :from the American l\1in-
ister reported that: 
"Peru yesterday recognized new Go,·ernment. Representatives 
here of all other countries unanimous in opinion that there should 
lJe no recognition now but unless something now unforeseen 
~hould occur in next few days provisional recognition of de facto 
Government with. ample guarantees [to] foreigners and foreign 
interests pending holding of fair elections might be made. I 
feel that we should recognize the new Government as soon as 
possible but make it sufficiently provisional to provide for any 
changes which would be mainly in the personnel if at all." 
(Ibid., p. 374.) 
The Secretary of State had said on the same date : 
"The Departrnent desires to impress upon you the necessity of 
exercising utmost discretion in communicating with revolutionary 
Government. Your dealing with Junta should be limited to 
entirely unofficial and infonnal intercourse, and you should con-
fine your representations to questions affecting the interests of 
the United States and the security of American life and property, 
bearing in mind the fact that the Government of the United 
~tates has not as yet recognized the revolutionary Government 
as being eYen a de facto governtnent." (Ibid., p. 374.) 
Paraguay recognized the ne'v government July 30, 
1920, and the British Government planned to recognize 
the de facto government a week later unless the situation 
changed. Other states deemed it expedient to wait till 
after elections ''ere held before taking action. 
There 'vas correspondence of representatives of the 
"l~nitecl States and other states in regard to recognizing 
the de facto government simultaneously. Recognition 
of a goyernment by concurrent action n1ay avoid confu-
sion in some cases and 'viii usually strengthen the posi-
tion of the goYernment recognized. By preYious under-
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standii)g the ne'v govern1nent o:f Bolivia 'vas recognized 
by the United States, Argentina, Chile and Brazil at 
3 P. M., February 9, 1921. 
Simultaneous recognition o:f Paraguay took place on 
:\larch 14, 1936. 
The An1erican Charge d'Affaires at La Paz on ~fay 30, 
1936, extended recognition to the Government o:f Bolivia, 
and Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, and other 
A1nerican republics took similar action at the same time. 
Joint delay in recognition.-In 1921, 'vhen affairs in 
~Iexico 'vere disturbed, there 'vas much correspondence 
an1ong :foreign offices in regard to delaying recognition. 
The exchange o:f telegra1ns bet,v_een the governments o:f 
the United States and o:f Belgiun1 sho,vs such delay : 
"BRussELS, Novernber 4, 1921, 4 p. 1n. 
[Received November 5, 1: 45 p. 111.] 
"48. Department's number 46, October 31, 1921. I have cOiu-
municated with Jaspar, who has agreed not to extend recognition 
to the Obr~on Government until such time as Great Britain. 
France, ana the United States take such action. He states. how-
ever, that on account of the importanc.e of Belgian interests in 
Mexico, the Government of Belgium would not want to be placed 
in a position of being the last to extend recognition, and therefore 
asks that when the time comes for any action looking toward 
recognition, such action be taken simultaneously. Do you think 
that an arrangement along these lines, which would solve Jaspar's 
perplexities, 'vould be agreeable to the Department? 
'VHITI:OCK" 
"WASHINGTON, Noventber 9, 1921, 2 p. ·m. 
"47. Embassy's telegram number 48, November 4, 1921, 4 p. n1. 
Inform the l\1inistcr of Foreign Affairs that we are highly pleased 
to learn that the Government of Belgium has agreed not to extend 
recognition to the Obregon Government until such time as Great 
Britain, Fr[lnce, and the United States take such action. You 
may give him assurance that when the time comes for any action 
looking toward recognition, this Government will be pleased to 
inform the Government of Belgium, to the end that such action 
be taken simultaneously." (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1921, vol. II, 
p. 438.) 
0 ollective recall of recognition.-During the unsettled 
state o:f affairs in Costa Rica in 1919 there 'vere proposi-
tions in regard to collective or joint action by the Central 
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An1erican States. On July 7, 1919, the American :Niinis-
ter to Nicaragua reported to the Department of State 
fron1 )fanagua by telegram: 
"Nicaraguan :\linister for Foreign Affairs informed me that he 
received a telegram from Salvadorean :\Iini~ter for Foreign 
Affairs calling attention to the recent events that have taken 
place in Costa Rica and the gravity of the situation and the possi-
bility of American intervention resulting therefrom, and the 
necessity of joint action of the Central American States to adopt 
some plan of action to bring about a solution of impending diffi-
culties. Salvadorean Government requests the Nicaraguan Go\-
ernment to offer such suggestions as it 1nay judge most convenient 
and expedient. Nicaraguan Government replied to the effect that 
it approves important step taken by Salvadorean Government and 
suggests that it take up the question with all Central American 
States; that the Nicaraguan Government adheres to the principles 
of the 'Vashington convention of 1907 and therefore suggests that 
the respecti\e Central American States proceed to recall their 
recognition of the Tinoco government ; this should be done within 
the next 30 days. This done it would place the several Govern-
Inents on an equal footing and then they could proceed to unite it 
formulating a plan of concerted action. 
JEFFERSON." 
(Foreign Relations, U. S., 1919, vol. I, p. 844.) 
A Senate resolution asked 'vhy "Costa Ricd, a bellig-
erent with the Allies in the War just ended, was not 
permitted to sign the treaty of peace at Versailles." In 
a reply of August 16, 1919, the Secretary of State said: 
''In view of the fact that the Government of the United States 
has not recognized the existence in the Republic of Costa Rica 
of a de jure or even a legitimately de facto Government, but holds 
that only the people of Costa Rica can as a moral force set up 
in that country a government constitutional in character and duly 
sanctioned by law, it follows naturally that the Government of the 
United States could not recognize as legally existent any mani-
festation of such a Government. 
"To declare war is one of the highest acts of sovereignty. The 
Government of Costa Rica being for the Government of the United 
States legally nonexistent, it follows so far as the Government 
of the United States is concerned, no state of war could exist 
between Costa Rica and the Imperial German Government. Obvi-
ously there could be no question so far as this Government was 




( Ibid. , p. 853.) 
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Restriction on declaration of toar.-That a third state 
should interfere to prevent two other states :fron1 de-
claring war would be unusual. In 1921 the relations o:£ 
Panama and Costa Rica were severely strained in dis-
pute over a boundary line. This line had already been 
t'-rice submitted to arbitration, once to the French Gov-
ernment (Lou bet A ward, Sept. 11, 1900, Foreign Rela-
tions, U. S., 1910, p. 786), and once to the Chie:£ Justice 
o:£ the United States (vVhite Award, Sept. 12~ 1914, For-
eign Relations, U.S., 1914, p. 1000). Both these awards 
gave rise to controversies, and Panama and Costa Rica 
resorted to hostile action. This led the Secretary o:£ 
State !o telegraph at midnight, March 2, 1921, to the 
}_._merican Minister at Panama as :follows: 
"The Government of the United Stutes has seen with the deep-
est regret the hostilities which have tali:en place between the 
armed forces of Panama and Costa Rica, from which loss of life 
has resulted, and which have caused public sentiment in both 
countries to be inflamed to a dangerous degree. It will be evi-
dent to the Government of Panama that this Government, by 
reason of its special interests in the Isthmus, could not but view 
with the gravest apprehension any developments which will dis-
Lurb the peace and tranquillity of Central America. While the 
Government of the United States appreciates the assurances con-
,·eyed through you by the Government of Panama, the Govern-
ment of the United States feels that a declaration of war because 
of a controversy growing out of the inability of the Republics of 
Costa Rica and Panama to agree upon a solution of the boundary 
dispute, would be inadmissible. The dispute is one, as pointed 
out in the Department's February 28, 2 p.m., which has already 
been exan1ined during a period of years in the 1nost disinterested 
and judicial Inanner, and it cannot but be evident that the only 
lusting solution which can be found will be reached as the result 
of the friendly offices of an impartial party to the controversy 
and not by hostilities of the character which have already taken 
place, which tend only further to excite the passions of the unruly 
~lement in the populations of both Republics." (Foreign Rela-
tions, U. S., 1921, vo. 1, p. 177.) 
A similar dispatch was sent to the American Charge 
jn Costa Rica. 
Both Central American governntents 'vere advised to 
withdraw their troops to the stat1.ts quo, Cerro Pando-
Punta Burica line, pending a final settlen1ent. The 
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Gnited States acting as 1nediator inforn1ed Pana1na that 
the .... ~nerican govern1nent regarded the I .. oubet a'vard 
of territory on the Pacific to Costa Rica as just. and that 
11nder the treaty relations bet,Yeen the Unii.ecl States antl 
Pana1na could not "pern1it a rene,val of hostilities by 
Panan1a against Costa Rica by reason of Costa Rica's 
no'' taking peaceful possession of that territory" (Ibid, 
p. 226). Panan1a announced its intention to avoid giv-
~ng cause for friction in this 1natter. 
Recognition in general.-The term recognition is used 
in different senses. 
Few, if any: problen1s arise '\vhen the tenn is used to 
designate the act by '\Yhich one state takes notice of a 
change in another state, w·hen the change is in ·accord 
''ith established or constitutional procedure. The suc-
cession of hereditary rulers 1nay involYe recognition of a 
new person in the position of authority, but no change 
in any other respect. In a government such as that of 
the United States, presidents succeed one another in a 
c-onstitutional 1nanner and a form of recognition is given 
by foreign states to this fact without ~nvolving any 
change in the identity or responsibility of the state itself. 
It ·was said in the case of the Sapphire in 1871: 
"The reigning sovereign represents the national soYereigntr. and 
that soYereignty is continuous and perpetual resting in the proper 
:-;nccessors of the soYereign for the time beiug." (11 "1'allace. 
Snpr('me Court Reports, 164.) 
The recognition by a state of a ne'\v political entity 
''"hich has been formed in accord '\Yith the ''ill of the 
party or parties '\vithin "~hose juri~diction the area and 
population formerly '\Yere is a n1atter of policy and can 
giYe no offense. This ''as the case in recognition of 
f-tates set up under ter1ns of the Treaty of \T ersailles in 
l920. Sin1ilarly recognition of a state by another state 
f)ubsequent to recognition of the new political entity by 
the parent state, of 'Yhich it had formerly been a part, 
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<loes not give rise to serious problems. ~"fhe same 1nay 
Le said of recognition of a state formed by union of t\YO 
• or more states in accord \vith their own action. 
Problems of recognition have arisen most frequently 
in connection \vith the atten1pts of groups, varying in 
nature and objective, seeking to break off fro1n an r,stab-
lished state or to supplant an existing governn1ent. The 
policies of recognition in such cases have varied in dif-
ferent states and at different ti.mes in the sa1ne state. 
The changes in governments in Central and South 
... t\.n1erican states during the nineteenth and early t"~en..: 
tieth centuries afford many examples of recognition. 
After the vV orld \V ar new problems arose in regard 
to recognition. These \Yere numerous in the transition 
from the Russian Empire to the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics. In the case of the United States of 
A1nerica, sixteen years elapsed before recognition on 
November 16, 1933; but Russia did not recognize the 
United States after the Declaration of Independence 
for a period of thirty-three years, till 1809. In each 
case there was an apparent .dislike of the system of 
government that had been established. 
The failure of an established state to recognize by 
entering into diplomatic or other relations \Yith a po-
litical entity does not necessarily predicate anything as 
to its existence. 
The United States in the nineteenth century looked 
with favor upon the recognition of other American states 
setting up governments on a model similar to its o\vn 
and favored co1nplete separation from Europe. Recog-
nition on the basis of de facto control of the political 
organization was common, particularly when this in-
volved popular control. 
Later \Villingness of the ne\v entity to meet its obliga-
tions became a factor in granting recognition. 
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As relations became n1ore close, the question of the 
legitiinate character of a new government, as "~en as 
probable stability, were iinportant considerations. 
''Then a ne'v state 'vas set up by an international 
agreement of a general character, like some of the 
treaties of peace, recognition might follow 'vithout any 
iinplication as to the policy of the recognizing state. 
Recognition of a ne'v state or new government "" hich 
by revolution succeeds a prior state may merely be rec-
ognition of an accomplished fact. 
· The admission that an organized body of armed men 
are seeking a politic'al end in an established state n1ay 
be essential for the peaceful conduct of relations bet,veen 
the insurrectionists and outside states. This does not 
i1nply any recognition of a political status of the insur-
rectionists but merely an accon11nodation to the facts. 
Policy of the United States in 1870.-0n November 
16, 1870, the Spanish Cortes elected the Duke of Aosta 
l(ing of Spain. In reporting this the American Min-
ister stated that "The incidents of the session are not 
regarded as promising a tranquil reign nor even a peace-
ful accession to the throne." Referring to this con1~ 
1nunication, Secretary Fish said, December 16, 1870: 
"It has been the policy of the United States to recognize the 
g-overnments de facto of the countries with which we hold dip-
lomatic relations. Such was our course when the republic was 
established in France in 1848, and again in 1870, and in each 
case accepted by the French people. Such was our course in 
:Mexico when the republic was maintained by the people of that 
country in spite of foreign efforts to establish a monarchy hy 
military force. We have always accepted the general acqui-
escence of the people in a political change of government as a 
conclusive evidence of the will of the nation. When, however. 
there has not been such acquiescence, and armed resistance has 
been shown to changes made or attempted to be reade under the 
form of law, the United States have applied to other nations the 
rule that the organization which has possession of the national 
archives and of the traditions of government, and which has 
been inducted to power under the forms of law, must be pre-
sumed to be the exponent of the desires of the people, until a 
rival political organization shall have established the contrary. 
Your course in the present case will be governed by this rule. 
• 
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' 'Should there be circumstances which lead J·ou to doubt the 
propriety of recognizing the Duke of Aosta as King of Spain, it 
\Yill be easy to communicate with the Department by telegraph 
and ask instructions. Should there be no such circumstances, 
the general policy of the United States, as well as their in-
terests in the present relations with Spain, call for an early and 
cheerful recognition of the change which the nation has made." 
(Foreign Relations, U. S., 1871, p. 742.) 
Late nineteenth century policy .-The attitude of the 
United States in the late nineroenth century "\vas shown 
in instructions to diplomatic representatives in South 
.AJnerica. The Actirig Secretary of State wrote to the 
)finister as follo,vs : 
"Upon your return to your post, if you then ascertain that the 
provisional government of Bolivia being de facto administered 
by the junta according to regular methods, affording reasonable 
guarantees of stability and international responsibility, and 
without organized resistance, you will notify the junta that you 
are authorized by the President to enter into relations with 
the provisional government, and will notify the Department of 
your action in order that the President may make appropriate 
reply to the autograph letter addressed to him by the junta 
on the 26th of April last." (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1899, 
p. 107.) 
Secretary Hay instructed the Minister to the Domini-
can Republic, October 19, 1899: 
Upon your being satisfied that the new government of Santo 
Domingo is in possession of the executive forces of the nation 
and administering the public affairs with due regard for the 
obligations of international law and treaties, you will enter into 
full relations with it." (Ibid, p. 249.) 
Pana1na, 1903.-A circular letter from the provisional 
government comn1ittee in Panama was received by the 
Consul General, November 5, 1903, 12: 50 P. M., saying 
that the "Department of Panama "\vithdraws from the 
Republic of the United States of Colombia and formed 
the Republic of Panama." 
Secretary of State Hay sent the following telegram 
to the Consul General at 12: 51 P. M., November 6, 
1903: 
"The people of Panama have, by an apparently unanimous 
movement, dissolved their political connection with the Republic 
of Colombia and resumed their independence. When you are 
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satisfied that a de facto gon~rnment, republican in form, and 
without substantial opposition from its own people, has been 
established in the State of Panama, you will enter into relations 
with it as the responsible goV"ernment of the territory and look 
to it for all due action to protect the persons and property of 
citizens of the United States and to keep open the isthmian 
transit in accordance with the obligations of existing treaties 
governing the relation of the United States to that territory. 
"Communicate above to l\Iahnros, who will be governed -by 
those instructions in entering into relations with the local au-
thorities."' (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1003, p. 233.) 
Seizu.re by insurgents.-Among the more firmly es-
tablished states of the 'vorld there has been a grow·ing 
tendency in the twentieth century to take a less liberal 
attitude toward insurgents endeavoring to overthrow or 
to supplant recognized states. Stability in governments 
has been regarded as an attribute to be favored, and 
frequent changes to be discouraged. 
~Iany treaties have prov-ided that only established 
courts shall be competent to pass upon matters of prize. 
Seizure and detention by insurgents of vessels of 
states not recognizing the belligerency of the insurgents 
has been regarded as having no justification in la,v. 
rrhe statement of l\fr. 'Vharton, w·hen Solicitor in 
1885, 'vas detailed and coYered the proposal of Colo1nbia 
that insurgent vessels be treated as pirates: 
"DEPART:MEXT OF STATE. LAW BFRF...AU, 
1Vashington, D. C., May 18, 1885. 
"Sm: In my report of April 21, 1885, I stated as follows: 
'· (1) "\Yhen vessels belonging to citizens of the United States 
have been seized and are now navigated on the high seas by 
persons not representing any Go"Vernment or belligerent power 
recognized by the United States, such vessels may be captured 
nnd re.cued by their owners, or by United States cruisers act-
ing for such owners; and all force which is necessary for such 
purposes may be used to make the capture effectual. 
"(2) The Government of the United States of Colombia is 
liable not onl~· for any injury done by it or with its permission 
to citizens of the United State~ or their property, but for any 
such injury which by the exercise of reasonable care it could 
have averted; and it is also liable for damage done to such 
vessels when by reasonable care it would have averted such 
c!amage. 
"This report was approYed by the Secretary, and the company 
was duly informed thereof :\fay 16, 1883. I ha"Ve now before me, 
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tmder date of l\:lay 18, instant, a second application from the 
company, stating the· unlawful seizure of two additional vessels 
by the insurgents by whom the seizure noticed in the prior re-
port was made. I beg now to report that on this state of facts 
these steamers may be retaken by United States men-of-war and 
restored to their owners on the same principles as sustained the 
conclusion given to this effect in n1y prior report. Under all the 
circumstances of the case I now respectfully submit the follow-
ing directions be given by the Secretary: 
''First. That an instruction be sent to the United States min-
ister at Bogata containing this and the prior report above 
Inentioned. 
"Second. That the papers in this case be immediately for-
warded to the Secretary of the Navy, with the request that the 
vessels thus unlawfully seized and now possessed by the in-
surgents be retaken when on the high seas by any force the 
United States 1nay be able to use for that purpose. 
"In closing this report I beg to call attention to the follow-
ing paragraph at the end of the recent dispatch frmn this De-
partment as to the status on the high seas of vessels owned by 
the insurgents in question: 
"'Secondly. The Government of the United States cannot re-
gard as pi;ratical vessels manned by parties in arms against the 
Government of the United States of Colombia, when such ves-
sels are passing to and from ports held by such insurgents, 
or even when attacking ports in the possession of the National 
Government. In the late civil war the United States at an 
early period of the struggle surrendered the position that those 
n1anning the Confederate cruisers were pirates under inte:c-
national law. The United States of Colombia cannot, sooner or 
later, do otherwise than accept the sa1ne view. But, however 
this may be, no neutral power can acquiesce in the position now 
taken by the Colombian Government. 'Vhatever n1ay be the 
demerits of the vessels in the power of the insurgents, or what-
ever may be the status of those 1nanning them under the mu-
nicipal law of Colombia, if they be brought by the act of the 
Xational Government within the operation of that law, there 
can be no question that such vessels, when engaged as abo\·e 
stated, are not, by the law of nations, pirates; nor can they be 
regarded as pirates by the United States.' 
"It will be seen, therefore, that the crews n1anning these ves-
sels cannot be regarded by this Government as pirates. But 
while this is the case, and while it may be conceded that vessels 
seized by them on the high seas are seized under claim of right, 
yet, vessels belonging to citizens of the United States so seized 
by them Inay be rescued by our cruisers acting for the owners 
of such vessels in the same wav that we could reclahn vessels 
derelict on the high seas. " 
"Respectfully submitted. 
FRAXCis ".,.HARTox, Solicitor." 
(Foreign Relations, U. S., 1885, p. 212.) 
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Portugal, 1911.-In a telegratn frotn the Secretary of 
State to the Charge d'Affaires in Lisbon, J nne 6, 1911, 
it 'Yas stated: 
''So soon as the Constituent .Assembly, which n1eets on the 
19th instant, shall ha\e expressed the voice of the people and 
settled upon the fonn of government to be adopted by Portugal, 
you are instructed to inform the minister for foreign affairs 
of its official recognition by the Government of the United States 
of America. You will be prepared to do this if possible the same 
day that the Constituent Assembly takes definite and final 
action." (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1911, p. 690.) 
illexico, 1911.-In discussion of troubles in ~1exico in 
the early second decade of the twentieth century, ques-
tions arose in regard to the nature of certain actions of 
anned bodies of n1en. Of these acts Secretary 1\::nox, on 
J nne 17, 1911, said: 
"Without desiring to enter into any discus::;ion or controversy 
with your excellency regarding the status of persons who take 
up arms and make war under the circumstances recited in your 
note now under acknowledgment, I beg to suggest for your ex-
cellency's consideration that the movement in Lower California 
appears to be the result of the activities of a :Mexican political 
party; that it is reported that the a 'Vowed object of this ~Iexican 
party is the throwing off of Mexican authority and the estab-
lishment of a socialistic republic in Lower California; and 
finally that the subversion of one fonn of government and the 
establishment of another has, upon this he1nisphere, been uni-
formly regarded as a political 1novement entirely irrespecth·e of 
the propriety or justice of the cause espoused." (Foreign Rela-
tions, U. S., 1911, p. 500.) 
AI er:cico, 1913, 1915.-0n February 28, 1913, explana-
tions of the attitude of the United States to''""ard recog-
nition in ~fexico 'Yere con1municated to the Atnerican 
~.\.tnbassador: 
"The Government of the United States is in de facto relations 
for the purpose of transacting all business with those in de facto 
control, who are the only effective authority in evidence. 
Whether the recent resignations under duress and the subsequent 
proceedings of the ::\Iexican Congress suffice under the :\Iexican 
law to clothe the present regime with such de jure status as 
attached to the interim government of De la Barra is a question 
into which the Government of the United States is not now 
obliged to enter. 
''A distinction may be drawn between de facto relations with 
a de facto government and formal recognition of such gov-
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ernreent, just as the same distinction may be drawn between 
de facto relations with and formal recognition of a normal and 
permanent Government. Formal recognition would in either 
case require some formal act of recognition, as, for example, the 
formal reply to a note announcing the new government or the 
receiving or accrediting of an ambassador. Any such formal act 
of recognition is to be avoided just at the present. In the mean-
time this Government is considering the question in the light of 
the usual tests applied to such cases, important among which are 
the question of the degree to which the population of Mexico 
acquiesce in and assent to the new regime and the question of 
disposition and ability to protect foreigners and their interests 
and to respond to all international obligations." (Foreign Rela-
tions, Ibid., U. S., 1913, p. 748.) 
The Secretary of State made it generally known on 
October 19, 1915, that General Carranza had been recog-
nized as the Chief Executive of the de facto Government 
of Mexico, as follows: 
"The Ambassadors of Brazil, Chile and Argentina, and the 
1\Iinisters of Bolivia, Uruguay and Guatemala, who have been in 
conference with me in regard to the recognition of a government 
in Mexico, will, under instructions from their several Govern-
ments, recognize today the de facto Government of 1\:Iexico of 
which General Venustiano Carranza is the Chief Executive." 
(Ibid., 1915, p. 771.) 
The Secretary of State on the same day made kno\vn 
that the United States would accredit a diplomatic rep-
resentative to the de £acto government. 
Peru, 191,4.-A revolution in Peru, February 4, 1914, 
removed the President from office and placed executive 
e:"uthority in the hands of a Provisional Junta. A tele-
gram from the Secretary of State to the American Min-
ister on February 12, 1914, was as follows : 
"The Junta created by the Congress being in uncontested exer-
cise of executive power and such exercise being freely acquiesced 
in by the people, you are instructed to recognize the Junta as a 
Provisional Government pending the establishment of a permanent 
executive." 
"BRYAN." 
(Ibid., 1914, p. 1063.) 
Protectorate o·ver Egypt, 1919.-In reply to a letter o£ 
Senator Q,ven, the Secretary of State said on December 
16, 1919: 
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''SIR : I baYe the honor to ackno,vledge the receipt of your 
letter of ?\'ovcmher 29th last, in which ~your inquire as to the 
effect of this GoYernment's recognition of the so-called protec-
torate proclaimed by Great Britain oYer Egypt on December 18. 
1914. 
"In reply I beg to state that the Department does not nuder-
stand that Egypt was, prior to the British proclamation of De-
cember 18, 191,1, in possession of full independent ~overeign rights. 
"The effect of this GoYernment's qualified recognition of April, 
1919, was to acknowledge with the reserYation set forth at that 
time only such control of Egyptian affairs as had been set forth 
in the notice of the British Governn1ent transn1i tted to the De-
partment on December 18, 1914, a copy of which is enclosed. 
''It is assumed that it is the purpose of Great Britain to carry 
t..mt the as~urances given by King George the Fifth of England to 
the late Sultan of E~Tpt as published in the London Times of 
December 21, 1D14. 
"I have etc. 
ROEERT LAXSIXG.'' 
(Ibid., 1919, vol. II, p. 209.) 
Recognition of lVorld lr ar states.-The recognition 
of states set up as a result of the 'Vorld YV.ar is upon a 
basis w·holly unlike that in\olved in rec:Jgnition of a 
;>olitieal unity based upon insurrection or belligerency. 
The ne"T states set up by the Treaty of "'\T ersailles "Tere 
given place in the fan1ily of nations "·hen the provisions 
of the treaty came into effect and the responsibilities of 
state existence 'Yere en1bodied in a responsible govern-
lnent. 
The creation of some of these states \Yas due to action 
external to the area upon 'vhich the physical conditions 
of state existence rested and the political organization 
\Yas externally detern1ined for the area. A11 insurrection. 
ho,YeYer, has its origin within an exis6ng state and in 
opposition to its control. The parent state 1nay be re-
luctant to admit the existence of a ne'v 5tate in either 
case. 
Sympathetic interest.-J ust ho'v far a favorable atti-
tude of one state toward a party opposed to another 
established state may be made kno,,n is a matter of dif-
ference of opinion and may depend upon the strength and 
influence of the respectiv-e parties. 
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For so1netin1e previous to January 1913, there had been 
disturbed conditions in the Dominican Republic. On 
January 15, 1913, the American Minister reported to the 
Secretary of State: 
"President Nouel advised me this 1norning of a plot to gain 
possession of the fort here by prominent Horacista generals. 
Horacio Vasquez himself denounced the plot and offered to place 
himself and some of his followers in the fort to maintain order. 
"The Archbishop [President Nouel] bas for some time been 
urged arbitrarily to abolish the present Congress and make hiln-
~elf dictator. He has absolutely refused and is thinking of con-
Yoking Congress in extraordinary session to consider constitutional 
reforms and other matters. 
"He expresses himself as despondent over the probabilities of 
~uccess in his efforts for good governn1ent unless the Govern-
ment of the United States takes an active part in contro1ling elec-
tions and the establishment of a government expressing the will 
of the people. He therefore requests me to obtain from you if 
r•ossible a statement that can be made public as to the necessity 
of such a step on our part if the disorders of the vast should tend 
to recur. 
(Foreign Relations, U. S. 1913, p. 418.) 
The Secretary of State replied: 
RUSSELL." 
"DEP ARTME...~T OF STATE, 
"lVashington, January 22, 1913. 
"The following statement may be given to President Nouel as a 
message from me, to be made public if he sees fit: 
'' 'The most sympathetic interest is felt by the President and 
Government of the United States in your unselfish and patriotic 
efforts to maintain lawful and orderly government and to intro-
duce needful reforms, thus assuring to the Dominican nation the 
blessings of prosperity and peace. The President and Governn1ent 
of the United States sincerely wish that your patient endeaYors 
may so succeed as to exclude the possibility of a recurrence of 
such disorders as have afflicted the Dominican people. Those dis-
orders would by their recurrence make more onerous the duty of 
the United States under its conventional and moral obligations 
never to be indifferent to the peace and order of the Dominican 
Republic.' 
"You will do everything in your power to hold up the hands of 
the President, Archbishop Nouel, and to impress him with the 
necessity of patiently continuing in office. It would be well to 
advert in your conversations to the fact that under the present 
electoral law it is apparently almost impossible to accomplish 
much in the direction of free elections, however willing the GoY-
ernment of the United States might be to lend its aid; and that as 
a prerequisite to free elections it would seem indispensable to pro-
vide some form of previous registration and some form of voting 
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that would prevent fraud. You might also suggest in infonnal 
conversation that besides the electoral law other reforms seem to 
the Department to be urgently needed, and that these might pos-
sibly be accomplished without reform of the Constitution. For 
instance, reform of the laws relating to provincial and communal 
goYernments, the law of conscription (so as to provide for an 
annual enlistment by lot instead of at the will of local milibtry 
chiefs), and the creation of a right to question arrest by means of 
habeas corpus or other such proceedings. 
"You might also point out to the President how much easier it 
would be for the United States to lend its aid if necessary to 
assist in the conduct of free and orderly elections if such reforn1s 
were realized. 
KNox.'' 
(Ibid, p. 419.) 
Under date of September 12, 1913, Secretary Bryan set 
forth his policy under the Convention of 1907: 
"Firm in its intention to cooperate with the legally constituted 
Government in order that revolutionary actiYity may cease, the 
Department of State makes known to the revolutionists and those 
who foment revolutions the following: 
"Under the Convention of 1907, the Dominican Republic cannot 
increase its debt without the consent of the United States of 
America, and this Government will not consent that the Domini-
can Government increase its debts for the purpose of paying rev-
olutionary expenses and claims. l\loreover, this administration 
would look with disfavor on any administrative act that would 
have for its object increase of the taxes, thereby imposing a bur-
den upon the people, for the purpose of satisfying revolutionists. 
And should the revolution succeed, this Government, in view of 
the President's declaration of policy, would withhold recognition 
of the de facto government, and consequently withhold the por-
tion of the customs collections belonging to Santo Domingo as long 
as an unrecognized de facto government should exist.'' (Ibid, 
p. 427.) 
Civil strife and belligerent cruiser.-In 1915 while 
Liberia was neutral, a British cruiser, the Highflyer, 
reported to the President of Liberia that it had come to 
nfonrovia to offer assistance in civil disturbances then 
preYailing. An American Yessel of war had been re-
quested by Liberia and the vessel had been sent. 
On October 19, 1915, the Alnerican Charge at l\fonroYia 
reported: 
"The British Highflyer arrived :Monrovia yesterday. Informed 
~hat Commander states to President be was ordered here by Brit-
Ish Government to offer Liberian Government assistance in Kru 
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disturbances until arrival Chester. Liberian Government, having 
appealed to the Government of the United States for aid, prefers 
not to avail itself of British assistance except so advised by the 
Government of the United States. Disturbances unabated but 
measures already taken deemed sufficient to hold situation until 
Chester arrives November 1. Liberian Government awaits De-
partment's advice before answering Commander." (Foreign 
Relations, U. S., 1915, p. 629.) 
The Secretary of Stat: then communicated with the 
American Ambassador at London, who immediately 
replied: 
"DEJPART:MENT OF STATE, 
Washington, October 20, 1915. 
"2312. Legation, l\1onrovia, advises that British cruiser High-
flyer arrived Monrovia October 18. Commander informs President 
of Liberia that he was ordered there to offer assistance in quelling 
uprising of native Krus until arrival of American naval steamship 
Chester due about November 1. Department informed measures 
already adopted deemed sufficient to hold disturbances in check 
until arrival Chester and Liberian Government, while deeply 
appreciative courteous offer, feels that its position of neutrality 
would be violated by Highftyer remaining in Liberian water more 
than twenty-four hours. Take case up immediately with British 
Government. Cable reply. Department has communicated orally 
with British Embassy here. 
LANSING." 
"AMERIOAN EMBASSY, 
London, October 21, 1915. 
"3070. Your 2312, October 20. The British Government has tel-
egraphed its Consul General at Monrovia to instruct the com-
mander of the Highftyer to depart immediately unless disorder 
demands its presence. 
(Ibid., p. 630.) 
AMEJRICAN AMBASS,ADOB .• , 
Poland, 1.919.-0n January 22, 1919, the American 
Commission to Negotiate Peace sent to the Acting Secre-
tary of State the following in regard to the Provisional 
Polish Government: 
"Acting under direction from the President, I have sent the 
following telegram to Mr. Paderewski which gives full recomition 
to ~he Pr?vision~l Poli~h Government. In view of the ne~essity 
of Immediate action I did not send the communication through the 
Department as I would normally do. 
"Following is the message : 
" 'The President of the United States directs me to extend to 
you as Prime Minister and Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the 
1820-37--3 
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Provisional Polish Government his sincere wishes for your success 
in the high oflice which you have assumed and his earnest hope 
that the Government of which you are a part will bring prosperit;y 
to the Republic of Poland. 
" 'It is my privilege to extend to you at this time 1ny personal 
greetings and officially to assure you that it will be a source of 
gratification to enter into official relations with you at the earliest 
opportunity. To render to your country such aid as is possible 
at this tilne as it enters upon a ne~cycle of independent life, will 
be in full accord with that spirit of friendliness which has in the 
pnst animated the American people in their relations with your 
countrymen.'" (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1D1D, \Ol. II, p. 741.) 
Y1~;goslavia, 1919.-rrhe American Comn1ission to Ne-
gotiate Peace connnunicated the follo\ving to the Acting 
Secretary of State on February 6, 1919 : 
"The Secretary of State will give out on l1,ebruary 7th the 
following statement in regard to the union of the Jugo Slav 
peoples, which you may give out to the press immediately: 
" 'On )lay 29, 1918, the Government of the United States ex-
pressed its sympathy for the nationalistic aspirations of the Jugo 
SlaY race and on June 28 declared that all branches of the Slavish 
race should be completely freed from German and Austrian rule. 
After having achieved their freedom from foreign oppression the 
Jugo Slav [s] formerly under Austro-Hungarian rule on various 
occasions expressed the desire to unite with the Kingdom of 
Sen·in. The Servian Govern1nent on its part has publicly and 
officially accepted the Union of the Serb, Croat and SloYene 
peoples. The Government of the United States, therefore, wel-
comes the nnion while recognizing that the final settle1nent of 
territorial frontiers must be left to the Peace Conference for 
determination according to desires of the peoples concerned.' " 
(Ibid., p. 899.) 
The designation "Yugoslavia" becan1e official in prefer-
ence to "l(ingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes" by 
decree of October 3, 1929. 
Aid to established state.-Aid may be of various de-
scriptions and for differing reasons. States already 
established usually wish to maintain the status quo. 
Sometimes there 1nay be economic or other reasons for 
such a "·ish. Of course, if one state is in debt to the 
nationals of another state, the second state \vill be inter-
ested in the maintenance of the economic stability of the 
debtor state. 
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So1neti1nes a friendly attitude 1nay be interpreted to 
i1nply 1nore than had been originally intended. 
In a so1newhat involved state1nent of the Nicaraguan 
Minister to the Secretary of State of the United States, 
.. A .. ugust 24, 1921, it \vas said: 
"The Govern1nent of Nicaragua placing confidence in the loan 
contracts made sometime ago with the banking concerns of Brown 
Brothers and Company and J. & W. Seligman and Company of 
New York, with the friendly assistance of the Government of the 
United States, under which contracts the collection of the customs 
duties of the Republic was turned oyer to a Receiver General 
appointed by the GoYernment of Nicaragua and nominated by 
the Govern1nent of the United States through which contracts 
and through the financial plan which was set up in Nicaragua in 
accord with the Government of the United States, for the purpose 
of placing its public finances upon a substantial basis and thus 
promoting its progress and prosperity, for which purpose its 
general estimates were also kept within the amounts that were 
indispensable for the conduct of the Governn1ent, ailning to carry 
out the objects that have been aimed at and relying at the same 
time on the declarations of the Department of State that it would 
not brook any armed intervention against the Government of 
Nicaragua that would unavoidably be attended with the conse-
quence of throwing its budget out of balance and making it 
impossible to meet its obligations, for which Your Excellency's 
Government stands as the friendly mediator, the Government of 
)Jicarngua has omitted for eight years to keep its war stores on 
the proper footing and being at this juncture without available 
funds that \Vould provide these without a very serious upset in 
the discharge of its obligations, n1y Government wishes to be 
supplied by Your Excellency's Government from the stores left 
over fro1n the world war and to be paid for according to such 
arrange1nents as may be agreed to, the implements that may not 
be in nse and hereinbelow described: 
Five thousand rifles. 
Three 1nillion cartriclges for rifles. 
25 machine guns. 
250 thousand rounds for machine guns. 
2 military aeroplanes, with their regulation supply of ammuni-
tion and indispensable spare parts." (Foreign Relations, 1921, 
vol. II, p. 565.) 
When the Secretary of War raised \Yith the Secretary 
of State the question of general policy of the sale of arms, 
the Secretary of State replied that each request for the 
purchase of arn1s should be considered separately and 
according to its particular merits: 
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"'Vith regard to the particular case under discussion, I am 
inclined to think that the sale of the arms requested by Nicaragua 
would be desirable from the point of T'iew of this Deparhnent, in 
T'iew of our special interest in the maintenance of stable govern-
ment in that country, and in view of our participation in the 
supervision of the financial affairs of the Republic. I am informed 
that Nicaragua bas not at the present time sufficient war material 
to deal effectively with revolutionary bands which have been oper-
ating in the northern part of the Republic, and I consider it T'ery 
desirable that the Government should be placed in a position 
where it will be able to maintain order." (Ibid., p. 569.) 
Closure of ports.-An established state may close its 
ports in time of war to vessels of war of the belligerents 
or it n1ay prescribe the conditions of entrance and so-
journ. In absence of proclamation the 24-hour rule of 
sojourn generally prevails. 
The Institute of International Law in the session of 
1910 stated that a neutral state is free to close or to open 
its ports to vessels of 'var of the belligerents engaged in 
the contest. 
During the 'Vorld "\Var neutral states closed their ports 
within a given area to all vessels of war, closed son1e. 
ports as war ports or naval areas, closed many ports ex-
cept during specified hours, regulated or forbade the 
entrance of certain classes of vessels, and made other 
regulations. 
The principle that a neutral state may regulate or 
prohibit the use of its ports by vessels of 'var seems to be 
generally accepted. 
Soviet governrnents and r-ecognition.-After the abdi-
cation of Czar Nicholas II, March 15, 1917, a provisional 
government was established with a provisional ministry 
headed by I\:erensky. The United States through its 
ambassador formally recognized this ne\v government on 
)farch 22, 1917. 
The Bolsheviki overthre'v this new government in 
X ovmnber. The aim of the Bolsheviki was to set up a 
dictatorship of the proletariat involving a complete so-
cial and economic revolution 'vith the abolition of private 
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property and repudiation of prior international obliga-
tions. 
Partly from domestic party political pressure, Great 
Britain (February 1), Italy (February 7), and France 
(October 28) recognized the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics in 1924. Some neighboring states had pre-
viously recognized the U. S. S. R. The An1bassador of 
the Provisional Government of Russia remained in 
'Vashington in that capacity till the middle of 1922. 
The method of recognition of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics varied. Great Britain, France, Nor-
'vay, S'veden, and Denmark recognized by formal notes. 
Germany, Austria, Italy, Japan, and other states made 
treaties or ~stablished diplomatic relations. 
Oa8e of O'etjen v. Oentral Leather Oo., 1918.-The 
Supreme Court of the United States on March 11, 1918, 
said, 'vhen the question of the status of a revolutionary 
government 'vas· involved: 
"It is also the result of the interpretation by this court of the 
principles of international law that when a government which 
originates in revolution or revolt is recognized by the political 
department of our government as the de jure government of the 
country in which it is established, such recognition is retroactive 
in effect and validates all the actions and conduct of the govern-
ment so recognized from the commencement of its existence. 
lVillia.ms v. Bruf{y, 96 U. S. 176, 186; Underhill v. Hernandez, 
168 U.S. 250, 253. Sees. c. 65 Fed. Rep. 577. 
"To these principles we must add that: 'Every sovereign State 
is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign 
State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on 
the acts of the government of another done within its own terri-
tory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be ob-
tained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign 
powers as behveen themselves.' Underhill v. Hernande.~, 168 
U. S. 250, 253; American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 
u.s. 347. 
"Applying these principles of law to the case at bar, we have a 
duly commissioned military commander of what must be accepted 
as the legitimate government of 1\Iexico, in the progress of a 
revolution, and when conducting active independent operations, 
seizing and selling in l\1exico, as a military contribution, the 
property in controversy, at the time owned and in the possession 
of a citizen of l\1exico, the assignor of the plaintiff in error. 
Plainly this was the action, in 1\Iexico, of the legitimate 1\:Iexican 
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goYerntnent when dealing with a l\Iexican citizen, and, as we have 
seen, for the soundest reasons, and upon repeated decision of 
this court such action is not subject to reexamination and modi-
ftcation b:v the courts of this country. 
''The p~inciple that the conduct of one independent goYernment 
cannot be successfully questioned in the courts of another is as 
applicable to a case inYolYing the title to property brought within 
the custody of a court, such as we have here, as it was held to be 
to the cases cited, in which claims for damages were based upon 
nets done in a foreign country, for it rests at last upon the highest 
considerations of international comity and expediency. To permit 
the Yalidity of the acts of one sovereign State to be reexamined 
and perhaps condemned by the courts of another wouid Yery cer-
tainly 'imperil' the atnicable relations between governments and 
Yex the peace of nations.'" ·( Oetjen v. Oentral Leather Oo., 246 
u.s. 297.) 
This pri nci p]e has been reaffirmecl. in other A1nerican 
cases and also in cases before the English Courts. 
In the case of Princess Paley Olga Y. lreis.z in 1929, 
Scrutton, L. J., saicl: 
"The United States, situate in the neighbourhood of South and 
Central A1nerican Republics, where the life of any Governtnent is 
precarious and its death rarely by natural" causes, frequently 
found in its territory property seized by a reYolutionary force 
which ultimately succeeded in establishing itself in power and 
there sold the goods it had seized to persons who exported then1 
to the United States, where they were claimed by their original 
owners. In Oetjen Y. Central LPta.ther Oo. (2) these facts occurred 
with reference to a seizure in 1\Iexico of property of a :\Iexican 
citizen which when sold came into the United States, and in 
Ricaud v. American :Metal Co. (3) they occurred again with re-
spect to the property of a citizen of the United States." ( [1929] 
1 K. B., 718.) 
Revolution in /)pain. 19SC.-During the period of civil 
strife in Spain 1nany problems arose in regard to the 
treatn1ent of foreign property. In an instruction of the 
Department of State of the United States delivered to 
the Spanish Govern1nent on August 5, 1936~ it 'vas stated 
in beha]f of the United States that: 
''This Government cannot admit that private property, whether 
in the hands of American nationals or abandoned bv them tem-
porarily because of conditions over which they haYc no control, 
tnay be interfered with with impunity or denied the protection to 
which it is entitl~d under international law. This Government 
must, of course, look to the Government of Spain for the protec-
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tion of such property and for indemnification for any delinquency 
in this respect. 
''In the event of requisition for the necessities of war or other-
wise of American property this Government must insist that 
provision be made for prompt and full compensation to the 
owners." (Department of State. Press Release. Vol. XV, p. 
131.) 
\Vhen it was reported on August 30 that an aircraft 
had dropped bombs near the United States destroyer 
[{ ane, the Secretary of State on the same day in a state-
Inent said: 
"Since both the Government forces and the opposing forces in 
Spain, in the friendliest spirit, have made every possible effort 
to avoid injury to American nationals and American property, 
it can only be assumed that the attack on the United States 
destroyer Kane was due to its identity having been mistaken by 
a plane of one faction for a vessel of the other. 
''Because of this friendly attitude and the absence of any . 
motive whatsoever to attack an American vessel, it is not con-
ceivable that either a Spanish Government plane or an insurgent 
plane would knowingly make attack upon an American naval 
vessel. Tbe Secretary of State, at the direction of the President, 
immediately brought this incident to the attention of the Spanish 
Government, through the American Embassy at :\Iadrid, and to 
General Francisco Franco, informally through the American con-
sul at Seville, with the request that both sides issue instructions 
in the strongest terms, as the American Government feels con-
fident they will desire to do, to pr:e,ent another incident of this 
character, it being well known in every quarter that the sole 
purpose of the presence of American na\al vessels about the 
Spanish coast is to afford facilities for the ren1oval of American 
nationals from Spain." (Ibid., p. 103.) 
The Secretary of State also instructed the .. A.merican 
E1nbassy that: 
"Since the plane making the attack was unidentified the Presi-
dent has directed that this incident be brought to the attention 
of the Spanish Go\ernment, through you and informally, with no 
intention as to recognition, to the attention of General Franco 
through the American Consul at Seville, with the request that 
both sides issue instructions in the strongest terms, as the Ameri-
can Government feels confident they will desire to do, to prevent 
another incident of this character. 
"Take up this matter immediately with the Spanish Govern-
ment in the sense of the foregoing, and endeavor to obtain a 
categorical statement as to whether the plane n1aking this attack 
was a Government plane, and urge and insist upon definite assur-
ance that appropriate instructions will immediately be issued to 
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the GoYernment arn1ed forces. Telegraph ilnmediately and fully 
results of your representations." (Ibid. , p. 202.) 
R esu/Jne.-In the statement of Situation I states X, 
... ~ and B haYe recognized the insurrectionists against 
state Y, the Yotists, as state Yota. State X had pre-
Yiously given unofficial aid and show·n sympathy for the 
Yotists. Other states than X, A and B, have not recog-
nized the Y otists as a state, though the insurgency of 
the Y otists is admitted. 
The exact time at which a body of insurgents beco1nes 
a state before the parent state has recognized the1n as 
such is not settled. If the parent state grants recogni-
t ion, the soYereignty of the parent state terminates at 
the ti1ne of the grant and the insurrectionists, so fa_~ as 
·the parent state is concerned, become independent. The 
responsibility of the parent state for the acts of the 
insurrectionists terminates with this recognition. For 
foreign states granting the insurrectionists recognition 
as a state, the date 'vould be deter1nined by that of 
recognition. 
States A, B, and X, therefore, cannot hold state Y 
responsible for any acts of the recognized state Y ota, 
and Y ota 1nay carry on 'var under the accepted rules so 
far as states A, B, and X are concerned and the aircraft 
of Y ota " ·ould after declaration of "·ar be treated 
according to the rules of "·ar and neutrality. 
It is generally accepted that a declaration of war by 
a state creates a state of 'var as bet,veen it and the party 
against which the war has been declared. The parent 
state in time of insurrection is also under obligation to 
respect the la"·s of 'var. Prior to the recognition of the 
belligerency or statehood of insurgents by the parent 
state, non-recognizing states though admitting the fact 
of insurrection and accommodating themselves thereto 
migh~ be regarded as assuming an unfriendly attitude 
to"·ard the parent state if they accorded to the insur-
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gents the full rights of belligerents. It ·would, there-
fore, become a question of policy as to what attitude a 
state might take toward an insurgent party not recog-
nized by it or the parent state as a belligerent or as a 
state. The fact that three states have recognjzed in-
surgents as a state prior to recognition by the parent 
state puts other states under no obligation to treat the 
insurgents as belligerents or as a state. The fact, that 
the party admitted by all states other than three to be 
insurgents issues a declaration of war against a non-
recognizing state, does not change the legal relation-
ships of other non-recognizing states. To grant any 
o•er conclusion would be to encourage insurrections 
and declarations of ·war by parties not considered as 
having attained responsible political status. There 
would be no obligation upon non-recognizing states to 
submit to seizure of its merchant vessels by unrecog-
nized belligerents, nor would the non-recognizing states, 
eYen jf themselves at "\Yar, be under obligations to sub-
mit to restrictions in the use of ports not i1nposed by 
established states, though there might be risk when in-
surgents declare "\Var and are able by force to maintain 
the declaration "\vhich has been published. If the ports 
are those of a recognized state, the regulations of that 
state prevail. 
SOLUTION 
(a) 1. The naval and aircraft of Y ota and of 0 are 
to be treated by states B and D as naval and aircraft 
of belligerents, though Y ota would not be regarded as 
a state by state D. 
2. The recognition of Y ota as a state by Y entitles the 
naval and air craft of Yota to the sa1ne treatment as 
the naval and aircraft of state C in all neutral ports. 
(b) The cruiser of state D may, outside the jurisdic-
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tion of a foreign state, demand and use necessary force 
to rescue the n1erchant vessel of D. 
(c) State E, not having recognized the Y otists as a 
state, are not bound to respect the declaration of closure, 
though state E must take into consideration the risk 
jnyo]Yed in disregarding the declaration. 
